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ULTIMATE LIABILITY FOR FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES
Richard R. Powefl
THE PRoBLEM
Federal estate taxes have significance only as to sizable estates.'
When, however, the estate is really large, there are few problems
which deserve more detailed attention than the determination of the
location of ultimate liability for this type of tax-bite. Under the-
Internal Revenue Code, the gross taxable estate of a decedent includes
not only the assets passing by testate or intestate succession from the
decedent;2 but also a long list of "nontestamentary assets," such as
(a) life insurance; (b) appointive assets, as to which the decedent
has had some type of power of appointment; (c) gifts found to have
been made by the decedent "in contemplation of death"; (d) the
corpora of many types of trusts created by the decedent prior to his
death; (e) property owned with a spouse, or other relative or friend
in some form of ownership which includes a right of survivorship;
(f) Totten trust bank deposits; (g) United States bonds issued so as
to be "payable on death" to a designated beneficiary; and (h) other
varieties of interests enumerated in the statute. In estates of quite
modest sizability, life insurance, joint bank accounts and tenancies by
the entirety often constitute important factors. In really large estates
t Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia University, New York.
1. Federal estate taxes cannot affect a gross estate amounting to less than
$60,000. Practically, the utilization of statutory deductions for gifts to surviving
spouses and to charities causes gross estates up to $120,000 to be largely free
from these worries.
2. Such assets have great diversities, varying from a specific gift of a piano,
or of designated jewelry, or of designated shares of stock to a final gift of the
1residue.w
When a decedent dies intestate, leaving no assets which pass otherwise than
by intestacy, no problem of apportionment can arise, as the tax is deducted before
any computation of intestate shares. See Hampton's Adm'r v. Hampton, 188 Ky.
199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920); Martin v. Mai-tin's Adm'r, 283 Ky. 513, 142 S.W.2d
164 (1940).
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the nontestamentary assets frequently exceed in value the testamen-
tary assets of the decedent. It is not uncommon to find that the federal
estate tax amounts to a sum as great as, or even larger than, the total
testamentary estate. It thus becomes important to determine whether
the federal estate tax is to be apportioned among the total recipients
of benefit, or is to fall upon certain recipients in some fixed order of
priority as to burden.
THE "NORMALLY OPERATIVE RULE" AND DEVIATIONS THEREFROM
It is uniformly accepted law that a decedent can locate this ulti-
mate burden wherever he wishes it to fall, provided only he clearly
states his desires in the dispositive instrument. It is, unfortunately,
however, a subject on which the draftsmen of dispositive instruments
have, almost uniformly, done a poor job.3 Part of the trouble, on this
point, has been prevailing uncertainty as to the "normally operative
rule," that is, the rule which is applied if the instrument says nothing
on the topic. What is needed in each state is a clearcut "normally
operative rule," from which the draftsman can deviate by unambigu-
ously drawn clauses when any such deviation better serves his client's
desire. Furthermore, the thus established "normally operative rule"
should be the one likely to be wanted by a majority of the persons
making wills and trusts, thus reducing the frequency with which de-
viating tax clauses become necessary.
INGREDIENTS IN SOLUTION
The present content of the law on the ultimate liability for federal
estate taxes includes (a) certain sections in the federal statutes gov-
erning a small area only of the problem;4 (b) widely varying state
statutes which have been adopted in some seventeen of the American
jurisdictions;5 (c) judicial decisions in states having no governing
statutes;G and (d) the practices of lawyers and of courts in applying
3. See, stressing this fact, Sargent, Sins of Oversight in Wills and Trusts, 30
B.U.L. Rev. 301, 303 (1950); Sutter, How to Plan for Apportionment of Estate
Taxes, Estate Tax Techniques 2137 (Lasser ed. 1956).
Shifting the federal estate tax from the person normally chargeable to other
persons, see, e.g., Goodson v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1957);
Martin v. New Eng. Deaconess Hospital, 328 Mass. 259, 103 N.E.2d 240 (1952);
Lipic v. Wheeler, 362 Mo. 499, 242 S.W.2d 43 (1951); Vondermuhll v. Montclair
Trust Co., 14 N.J. Super. 300, 81 A.2d 822 (1951).
See also Kennon, Provision for Payment.of Death Taxes, 27 N.C.L. Rev. 94
(1948); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1951).
.4. See notes 8-12 infra.
5. See notes 19-32 infra.
6. See notes 33-37 infra.
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existing statutes.- It is believed that a careful examination of these
four ingredients of existing law will lead to a reasonable choice of
that which will best serve as the "normally operative rule," and
furnish a sound foundation for the drafting of the basic statute on
the subject. The details of such a statute will be, in many instances,
corollaries of the basic conclusion.
FEDERAL STATUTES ON APPORTIONMENT
The federal estate tax began with the Revenue Act of 1916." This
statute made the tax payable by a decedent's executor or adminis-
trator, included procedures for the attainment of a similar result, if
the fiduciary failed to perform this duty, but was completely silent
as to the location of the ultimate burden of this tax. Two years later,'
the provision on insurance, which now constitutes section 2206 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was adopted. This directed that, when
the gross estate of a decedent included insurance proceeds, the recipi-
ent of such proceeds can be compelled to contribute proportionately
to the resultant tax. This form of apportionment is now country-wide.
and has been applied many times by the courts. 0 In and since 1932,
the federal estate tax rates increased greatly. Contemporaneously, the
frequency of powers of appointment also increased substantially.
Where the gross estate of a decedent was found to include appointive
assets, a considerable number of state courts decided that the recipi-
ents of such assets should, even where no statute so required, be re-
7. See notes 4147 infra.
8. The earlier federal experience with a tax on the privilege of receiving assets
from a decedent is well reviewed in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
The beginning of the federal estate tax was the Revenue Act of 1916, § 200,
39 Stat. 777.
9. Revenue Act of 1918, § 408, 40 Stat. 1057.
10. See, e.g., Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d
918 (1951) ; Gaede v. Carroll, 114 N.J. Eq. 524, 169 Atl. 172 (1933) ; In re Bell's
Estate, 73 Montg. Co. Law Rept. 118 (Pa. 1958); Union Trust Co. v. Watson,
76 R.I. 223, 68 A.d 916 (1949).
The present text of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2206 is as follows:
"Unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross
estate on which tax has been paid consists of proceeds of policies of insurance on
the life of the decedent receivable by a beneficiary other than the executor, the
executor shall be entitled to recover from such beneficiary such portion of the
total tax paid as the proceeds of such policies bear to the sum of the taxable estate
and the amount of the exemption allowed in computing the taxable estate, deter-
mined under section 2051. If there is more than one such beneficiary, the executor
shall be entitled to recover from such beneficiaries in the same ratio. In the case
of such proceeds receivable by the surviving spouse of the decedent for which
a deduction is allowed under section 2056 (relating to marital deduction), this
section shall not apply to such proceeds except as to the amount thereof in excess
of the aggrcgate amount of the marital deductions allowed under such section."
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quired to pay a proportionate share of the resultant tax.,' The emi-
nent fairness of this result led to the provision in section 403 (c) of
the Revenue Act of 1942, which now constitutes section 2207 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.12 The provision required that when
the gross estate of a decedent includes appointive assets, the recipient
of these assets can be compelled to contribute proportionately to the
resultant tax. Thus the federal statute now requires apportionment'
of the federal estate tax as against those who receive either life in-
surance proceeds or appointive assets included in the gross estate of
a decedent. Apart from these two varieties of nontestamentary assets,
the federal legislation makes the tax payable by the estate fiduciary,
but leaves the location of the ultimate burden to the determination of
each state.
JUDICLL PRELUDE TO STATE STATUTES
Prior to 1916, all of the American experience with death taxes, both
state and national, had involved inheritance taxes, that is, taxes upon
the recipient's privilege to take.. Under such a tax it has uniformly
been held that each recipient should pay the tax attributable to his
1i. See, e.g., Regents of University System v. Trust Co., 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d
691' (1942); Hooker v. Drayton, 69 RI. 290, 33 A.2d 206 (1943) (as to a decedent
who died March 22, 1942, prior to the enactment of the federal statute, referred
to in note 12 infra). Cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Hart, 383 I1. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461
(1943) (reaching the opposite result as to a decedent who died in 1933).
12. See Int. lRev. C ode of 1939, § 826(d). added by 56 Stat. 943 (1942). This
statute became effective October 21,1942. As to it see H. R. Rep. 2333, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 163 (1942).
The present text of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2207 is as follows:
"Unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross
estate on which the tax has been paid consists of the value of property included
in the gross estate under section 2041, the executor shall .be entitled to recover
from the person receiving such property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or
release.of a power of appointment such portion of the total tax paid as the value
of such property bears to the sum of the taxable estate and the amount of the
exemption allowed in computing the taxable estate, determined under section
2052, or section 2106 (a), as the case may be. If there is more than one such per-
son, the executor shall be entitled to recover from such persons in the same ratio.
In the case of such propefty received by the surviving spouse of the decedent for
which a deduction is allowed under section 2056 (relating to marital deduction),
this section shall not apply to such property except as to the value thereof re-
duced by an amount equal to the excess of the aggregate amount of the marital
deductions allowed under section 2056 over the amount of proceeds of insurance
upon the life of the decedent receivable by the surviving spouse for which pro-
ceeds a marital deduction is allowed under such section."
As in other cases, the statutory rule applies only in the absence of a contrary
direction in the dispositive instrument. See Union Trust Co. v. Watson, 76 R.I.
223, 68 A.2d 916 (1949)
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receipt.'3 An early New Hampshire decision unthinkingly carried
over this practice to the federal estate tax.14 This decision was later
wisely overruled in New Hampshire.' s Other states soon saw that an
estate tax, imposed on the decedent's privilege to give, was highly like
other administration costs, being deductible before there was any-
thing to be distributed. Thus it became established law in many
states that the estate tax had to be borne by the residuary estate to
the extent that the residue sufficed.16 Apart from the 1918, later over-
ruled, decision of New Hampshire,'- there is no American decision
known to this writer, involving only assets passing under a will, where
a court (without a statutory directive) has departed from the
"burden-on-the-residue" principle. Many courts have reached this
same result, namely, that the burden of the tax falls on the residuary
estate, even when the gross estate of the decedent included nontesta-
mentary assets.&1
13. See, e.g, In re Shumack's Estate, 152 Cal. App. 2d 208, 313 P.2d 90 (1957);
Hackett v. Bankers Trust Co. 122 Conn. 107, 187 Atl. 653 (1936) ; Fidelity Union
T.-ist Co. v. Hall, 125 NJ. Eq. 419,6 A.2d 124 (1939); Fidelity Union Trust Co. V.
Anthony, 13 NJ. Super. 596, 81 A.2d 191, aff'd on other points, 18 N.J. Super.
49, 86 A.2d 594 (1952) ; Case v. Roebling, 42 NJ. Super. 545, 127 A.2d 409 (1956) ;
Central Trust Co. v. Lamb, 74 Ohio App. 299, 58 N.E.2d 785 (1944) (dictum);
Cunningham Estate, 69 Pa. D. & C. 579 (1949).
This rule is embodied in R. Gen. Laws § 44-23-19 (1956), as amended by R.L
Laws 1957, c. 154.
14. Fuller v. Gale, 78 N.H. 544, 103 AtL 308 (1918).
Cf. Lauritzen, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 1 Tax Couns. Q. 55,
57-62 (June 1957), supporting this position by an argument based on the general
doctrine of equitable apportionment applicable to joint debtors or co-sureties, and
by early cases involving either the apportionment of federal estate taxes to the
takers of nontestamentary assets, or the equal sharing of such taxes which neces-
sarily results from an intestate death.
15. Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200
AtL 786 (1938).
16. Applying the "%urden-on-the-residue" principle in cases involving only
testamentary assets, see Brown's Estate v. Hoge, 198 Iowa 373, 199 N.W. 320
(1936); Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919);
Amoskeag Trust Co., v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200 AtL 786
(1938) ; In re Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4, cert. denied, 250 U.S. 672 (1919)
(under law applicable before 1930 statute); Buffaloe v. Barnes, 226 N.C. 313, 38
S.E.2d 222 (1946); Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114, aff'd 264
U.S. 47 (1924); Vandervort v. Hodge, 93 Ohio App. 482, 113 N.E.2d 889 (1953);
In re O'Shea's Estate, 176 Ore. 500, 159 P.2d 198 (1945); Seattle-First Natl
Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203 P.2d 1078 (1949); In re Williamson's
Estate, 38 Wash. 2d 259, 229 P.2d 312 (1951).
17. See notes 14-15 supra.
18. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Older, 50 Cal. App. 2d 724, 123
P.2d 873 (1942) (inter vivos trust under law applicable before 1943 statute);
Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 198 Atl. 176 (1938) (inter vivos trust under law
applicable before 1945 statute); First Nat'l Bank v. Hart, 383 IlL 489, 50 N.E.2d
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STATUTES IN SEVENTEEN STATES
State statutes on the topic began with a New York enactment of
1930.19 This statute overgeneralized the increasingly realized desira-
bility of apportionment in some cases.20 It prescribed apportionment
as the "normally operative rule" applicable both to testamentary and
nontestamentary assets. 2' Other states hesitated to follow the New
York example, partly because of doubts as to the validity of a state
statute locating the burden of a federal tax. These doubts were eradi-
cated by a decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1942.22
This decision made it clear that, in cases not exactly covered by federal
legislation23 the ultimate burden of the federal estate tax could be
located wherever state law chose to locate it. New York legislative
innovations have had in other states a sometimes undeserved pre-
sumption as to wisdom. As a result, statutes embodying the policy
of the New York enactment of 1930 and establishing apportionment
as the "normally operative rule" applicable to both testamentary and
nontestamentary assets have been enacted, and still (in 1958) exist in
nine states other than New York, namely, Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Nebraska, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and
Virginia.24
461 (1943) (appointive assets, as to which the rule was changed prospectively by
change of federal statute in 1942, see note 12 supra) ; Central Trust Co. v. Burrow,
144 Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936) (gift made in contemplation of death); Bemis v.
Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923) (inter vivos trust under law appli-
cable before 1948 statute); Knowles v. Nat'l Bank, 345 Mich. 671, 76 N.W.2d 813
(1956) (inter vivos trust); Gelin v. Gelin, 229 Minn. 516, 40 N. W.2d 342 (1948)
(joint property); Brauburger v. Sheridan, 7 N.J. Super. 576, 72 A.2d 363 (1950)
(inter vivos trust under law applicable before 1950 statute); Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769, cert. denied, 266 U.S. 633
(1925) (inter. vivos trust under law applicable before 1930 statute); In re
Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953) (wife's non-barrable share).
As to the more recent growing body of judicial authority applying equitable
apportionment with respect to estates involving nontestamentary assets, see notes
33-35 infra.
19. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 124, enacted originally by N.Y. Laws c. 790 (1930),
to apply equally to both federal and New York estate taxes.
20. It "overgeneralized" the desirability of apportionment, since it took prior
decisions and arguments demonstrating the desirability of apportionment in cases
where nontestamentary assets were involved, and applied apportionment to testa-
mentary and nontestamentary assets alike.
21. Thus if a testator left an estate of $250,000, and by his will gave furniture
worth $1000 to a retired family retainer, and a ring worth $1000 to a close friend,
the retainer and friend would be compelled each to raise and to contribute between
$200 and $300 before becoming entitled to the given chattels.
22. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
23. These "exactly covered matters" were insurance proceeds after 1918 (see
note 9 supra) and appointive assets after October 21, 1942 (see note 12 supra).
24. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 63-150 (Supp. 1957), enacted by Ark. Laws 1943, No. 99,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss4/1
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Three other states, namely, Florida, M1aine and 'Massachusetts,
originally adopted general apportionment statutes patterned on the
New York prototype.- Of these three, Florida and 'Massachusetts
have modified their statutes, Florida by a complete return to the
"burden-on-the-residue" principle,2'$ and Massachusetts by a return to
the "burden-on-the-residue" principle as to testamentary assets, con-
fining apportionment to situations involving nontestamentary assets.2
7
Maine simply repealed its apportionment statute after an experience
with it lasting only two years.2 8
The statutes originally adopted in Maryland, New Hampshire and
New Jersey established apportionment as the normally operative rule
§ 1, p. 142, amended by Ark. Laws 1955, No. 122; Cal. Prob. Code §§ 970-77
(1956), enacted by Cal. Laws 1943, c. 894, with respect only to federal estate tax,
applied in Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Wellslager, 88 Cal. App. 2d 210, 198 P.2d
700 (1948); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 2075-81 (1949), enacted by Conn. Laws 1945,
§§ 314h-19h, 322h, with respect to federal estate tax and Connecticut estate and
inheritance taxes; held unconstitutional in so far as it might apply to persons
dying before July 18, 1945, by Parlato v. McCarthy, 136 Conn. 126, 69 A.2d 648
(1949); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 2901-06 (1953), enacted by Del. Laws 1946,
c. 119; Wilmington Trust Co. v. Copeland, 94 A.2d 703 (Del. 1953), held the
statute declaratory of existing law and therefore its application to the estates of
persons dying before its enactment was constitutional; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2108
(Supp. 1955), enacted by Neb. Laws 1949, c. 222, § 1; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§
150.290-.390 (1957), enacted by Nev. Laws 1957, c. 157, §§ 1-13, as a modification
of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2108 (Supp. 1955); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 844 (Purdon
1950), for period 1937-51; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 881-87 (Purdon Supp. 1957),
originally enacted by Pa. Laws 1937, c. 2767, and revised into the Pa. Est. Tax
Apportionment Act of 1951, enacted by Pa. Laws 1951, c. 1405; Williams, Notes
on the Estate Tax Apportionment Act of 1951, 56 Dick. L. Rev. 210 (1952), gives
the views of the sponsor of this Act as to its purposes and accomplishments; In re
Dravo's Estate, 388 Pa. 551, 131 A.2d 351 (19.;7); Tenn. Code §§ 30-1117 to -1118
(1955), enacted by Tenn. Laws 1943, c. 109, applicable to federal estate tax only;
Va. Code §§ 64-150 to -155 (1956), enacted by Va. Laws 1946, c. 128.
As to the history and content of the proration movement see Annot., 37
A.L.R.2d 199 (1954); Payne, Apportionment of State and Federal Estate Taxes,
11 Miami L.Q. 265 (1957); Preston, Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax, 3
Western Res. L. Rev. 164 (1951); Scoles, Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax
and Conflict of Laws, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 261 (1955); Note, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 690
(1940); Note, 30 Ind. L.J. 217 (1955).
25. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25435, §§ 1-4 (general apportionment statute) (con-
strued in In re Gato's Estate, 276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't),
aft'd, 301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E.2d 924 (1950), to have been declaratory of pre-existing
law); Me. Laws, 1945, c. 269; Mass. Laws, 1943, c. 519" (held constitutionally
applicable to the estate of one who died prior to statute's enactment by Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Merchants Natl Bank, 318 Mass. 563, 62 N.E.2d 831 (1945)).
26. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 734.041 (Supp. 1957).
27. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 65A, §§ 5-5B (1953).
28. Me. Laws 1947, c. 220; Me. Laws 1949, c. .49, § 135.
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applicable to nontestamentary assets, leaving the "burden-on-the-
residue" principle applicable to testamentary assets.2'
Alabama since 1951 has had a statute establishing generally the
"burden-on-the-residue" principle as to assets both testamentary and
nontestamentary. 30
Thus in the seventeen states having statutes on this topic in 1958,
ten states have generally applicable apportionment statutes, four
states confine apportionment to nontestamentary assets, and three
states have returned to, or initially established, the "burden-on-the-
residue" principle as to both testamentary and nontestamentary as-
sets.-" It should be noted that changes in these statutes, made during
the past two decades, reveal a uniform evolution away from applying
apportionment generally.32
JUDICIAL POSITIONS IN NONSTATUTORY STATES
In addition to the seventeen states dealt with above which have
more or less complete statutory answers on the present topic, there
are thirty-one other states (soon to become thirty-two by the addition
of Alaska). In nine of these states, the courts have employed a ju-
dicial doctrine of equitable apportionment to compel persons taking
nontestamentary assets to share in the payment of the federal estate
tax. 3 One of this nine has made the judicial picture complete by
29. Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 162 (1957), enacted by Md. Laws 1937, c. 546,
and amended in minor particulars by Md. Laws 1947, c. 156, and by Md. Laws 1957,
c. 747; N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 88:1-:4 (1955), enacted by N.H. Laws 1943, c. 175;
N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 3A, c. 25, §§ 30-38 (1953), enacted by NJ. Laws 1950, c. 327,
commented on in 6 Rutgers L. Rev. 127, 137 (1951); Vondermuhll v. Montclair
Trust Co., 14 N.J. Super. 300, 81 A.2d 822 (1951), held the statute not applicable
to a 1947 decedent; In re Burnett, 43 N.J. Super. 534, 129 A.2d 321 (1957), apply-
ing apportionment to the inter vivos trust assets included in the decedent's gross
estate, despite a will clause construed to apply only to testamentary assets.
30. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 51, § 449(1) (Supp. 1953).
31. See notes 19-30 supra.
32. Somhe state statutes, applicable either to state taxes only or to very special
situations reveal the same trend. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. §§ 14-402(10e),
14-403f (1948); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 291.40 (Supp. 1957), changed from its 1931
form by Minn. Laws 1951, c. 249,-§ 1; N.D. Code § 57-3723 (1943); Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. Art: 3683a (Vernon 1952), enacted by Tex. Laws 1947, c. 401, as
to pre-1948 community property; applied in Matthews v. Jones, 245 S.W.2d 974
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952), repealed by Tex. Laws 1955, c. 55, § 434.
33. Regents of University System v. Trust Co., 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d 691
(1942) (appointive assets) (result since ratified by federal amendment, see note
12 supra); In re Comers Trust, 101 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (applying
Georgia law to inter vivos Tevocable trust); Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E'2d 918 (1951) (joint bank accounts and a tenancy by
the entirety); Louisville Trust Co. v. Walter, 306 Ky. 756, 207 S.W.2d 328 (1948)
(testator left will, but lapsed gift of land passed outside the will); Trimble v.
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denying apportionment as between those taking under a will. 31 In an
additional two states decisions deny apportionment as between those
taking under a will, but have not considered apportionment with re-
spect to nontestamentary takers.35 In nine of the remaining twenty
states it is clear that the "burden-on-the-residue" principle prevails
both as to testamentary and nontestamentary assets.36 In the remain-
ing eleven states neither statutes nor decisions give certainty as to the
law, but the writings and opinions of judges and lawyers, familiar
Hatcher's Ex'rs, 295 Ky. 178, 173 S.W.2d 985, cert. denied, 321 U.S. 747 (1943)
(gift made in contemplation of death); Succession of Ratliff, 212 La. 563, 33
So. 2d 114 (1947) (community property passing outside the will); Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954) (annuity contract); Traders Nat'l
Bank v. United.States, 148 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Mo. 1956) (commuted dower);
In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112,255 P.2d 317 (1953) (jointly owned and com-
munity property, stressing propriety of confining apportionment to nontestamen-
tary assets); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879
(1953) (computing wife's statutory share after computation of federal tax placed
portion of tax load on this share taken outside the will); Miller v. Hammond, 156
Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952) (apportionment as to nontestamentary asset
taken by spouse, coupled with granting of tax exemption up to limit of marital
deduction); McDougall v. Central Natl Bank, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104-N.E.2d 441
(1952) (inter vivos trust); Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695
(1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 911 (1955) (overruling that part of Miller v. Ham-
mond, supra, which required computation of widow's statutory share free from
federal estate tax); Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlong, 77 Ri. 428, 76 A.2d 600
(1950) (inter vivos trusts); Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R.I. 290, 33 A.2d 206 (1943)
(appointive assets, result since ratified by federal amendment, note 12 supra, but
ease stresses line between "true estate" of a decedent and "gross estate" of a
decedent for tax .purposes).
4. Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), aft'd, 264 U.S.
47 (1924); In re Cole's Estate, 64 Ohio L. Abs. 138, 111 N.E.2d 35 (1952).
See also Preston, Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax, 3 Western Res. L..
Rev. 164 (1951).
The same result is clearly indicated for New Mexico and Rhode Island. See
In re Gallagher's Will and Hooker v. Drayton, supra note 33. It is also implicit
in all the other decisions cited note 33 supra.
35. Brown's Estate v. Hoge, 198 Iowa 373, 199 N.W. 320 (1924); In re O'Shea's
Estate, 176 Ore. 500, 159 P.2d 198 (1945).
36. First Nat'l Bank v. Hart, 383 IlL 489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943) (result as
to appointive assets changed by later enacted federal amendment, see note 12
supra, but reasoning that tax is item of expense, chargeable to residuary estate,
applies to other situations); Franz v. Schneider, 14 Ill. App. 2d 464, 44 N.E.2d
798 (1957) (dictum); Central Trust Co. v. Burron, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469
(1936) (apportionment refused as to gift made in contemplation of death);
Moorman v. Moorman, 340 Mich. 636, 66 N.W.2d 248 (1954) (basing holding on
reasoning of nonapportionment, but specific result as to burden of tax on spouse
taking statutory share outside will changed by Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3178(167)
(1955); Gelin v. Gelin, 229 Minn. 516, 40 N.W.2d 342 (1949) (refusing appor-
tionment as to property owned jointly by spouse and decedent, and as to United.
States bonds, passing by form of issue-to son); Gaither v." United States Trust
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with local practice, indicate acceptance of the "burden-on-the-residue"
principle in most of these jurisdictions2 7
Putting together all of the foregoing material, it can be said gen-
erally that ten states have all inclusive apportionment by statute ;38
fifteen states permit apportionment as to nontestamentary assets, four
reaching this result by statute and eleven by decisions ;39 and twenty-
three states accept generally the "burden-on-the-residue" principle,
three reaching this result by statute, nine by decisions and the balance
by commonly accepted practice."'
SATISFACTORINESS OF STATUTORY RULES
An important question remains for consideration. To what extent,
if at all, is there evidence as to which of the normally operative
rules works best? As has been stated earlier, the criterion on this
Co., 230 S.c. 568, 97 S.E.2d 24 (1957) (apportionment refused as to inter vivos
trusts); State Tax Comm'n v. Backman, 88 Utah 424, 55 P.2d 171 (1936) (with
respect to charitable gift and state death tax) ; In re Miller's Estate, 316 P.2d 124
(Wash. 1957) (apportioning tax between will takers because of intent found to
deviate from normal "burden-on-the-residue" principle); In re Heringer's Estate,
38 Wash. 2d 399, 230 P.2d 297 (1951) (apportioning tax because of found intent
to deviate from normal "burden-on-the-residue" principle); Seattle-First Nat'l
Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d. 696, 203 P.2d 1078 (1949) (exhausting residue
to pay tax caused by inter vivos trust before resorting to other assets); Central
Trust Co. v. James, 120 W. Va. 611, 199 S.E. 881 (1938); Kanawha Banking &
Trust Co. v. Alderson, 129 W. Va. 510, 40 S.E.2d 881 (1946); In re Will of Kootz,
228 Wis. 306, 280 N.W. 672 (1938) (dictum); In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362,
59 N.W2d 641 (1953).
37. As to Colorado, see Brofman (Judge of the Denver County Court), Burden
of Federal Estate Taxes, 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 498 (1957); as to the remaining
states, except Idaho, see reports from various lawyers collected in Lauritzen,
supra note 14, at 96-135. The state, name of the lawyer, and the page at which
the report appears are: Arizona, William T. McManamon of Chicago, Ill., at 96;
Mississippi, Harry Phillips of Nashville, Tenn., at 117; Montana, .Perris S. Jen-
sen of Salt Lake City, Utah, at 118; North Dakota, David Brofman of Denver,
Colo., at 123; Oklahoma, John F. Dillard of Houston, Tex., at 124; South Dakota,
Thomas F. McDonald of St. Louis, Mo., at 126; Texas, John F. Dillard of Houston,
Tex., at 128; Vermont. Eugene Howard of Toledo, Ohio, at 129; Wyoming, Clyde
Jones of Ottumwa, Iowa, at 134.
38. These states are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Virginia. See note 24 supra.
39. The statutory states are Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and
New Jersey. See notes 26 and 29 supra.
The nonstatutory states are Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mis-
souri, New Mexico, North Carolina,.Ohio, Oregon and Rhode Island.
40. The statutory states are Alabama, Florida and Maine. See notes 26, 28
and 30 supra.
The decisional states are Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, South Caro-
lina, Utah, Washington, 'West Virginia and Wisconsin. See note 36 supra.
The "practice" states are Arizona, Colorado, Mississippi, Montana, North
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point is which rule is the one "more likely to be wanted by a majority
of the persons making wills and trusts." The New York experience
is illuminating on this point. In that state it has come to be accepted
that a will which does not exclude the statutorily declared rule as to
testamentary assets has presumptively been drawn by an inexpert
draftsman.41 Where a New York will contains a tax clause excluding
apportionment, courts are liberal in finding the clause applicable to
the testamentary assets but reluctant to find it applicable to the assets
passing outside the will.42 This means that in New York, disposers of
property, who are competently advised, normally desire apportion-
ment as to nontestamentary assets, but do not desire apportionment
as to the assets passing under the will. Similar evidence exists as to
other states having a general apportionment statute, such as Connect-
icut, '4 Delaware,4 Pennsylvania 4 and Tennessee." In states where
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont and Wyoming. As to Idaho
the evidence is inconclusive.
41. Paul D. Bernard, Esq., has been practicing in this field since 1926. He has
worked with the City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. since 1945. In a letter dated
April 17, 1957, he wrote to the writer of this article: "In cases where the assets
which did not pass under the will (such as insurance not payable to the estate,
jointly held property or the corpus of inter vivos trust) were nonexistent or com-
paratively small, I do not recall any will that did not contain a clause directing
that estate taxes be paid out of the residuary or general estate, except in rare
instances where it was omitted because of inadvertence or inexperience."
A similar statement could be obtained from alniost any counsel experienced in
New York law.
Enforcing such will provisions, see In the Matter of Dickinson, 10 Misc. 2d 274,
167 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Surr. Ct. 1957); In the Matter of King, 6 Misc. 2d 922, 160
N.Y.S.2d 929 (Surr. Ct. 1957); In the Matter of Sheldon, 4 Misc. 2d 119, 157
N.Y.S.2d 666 (Surr. Ct. 1957); In the Matter of Zuckerman, 3 Misc. 2d 671,
155 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
42. In the Matter of Bros, 170 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Surr. Ct. 1958) ; In the Matter of
Fischer, 5 Misc. 2d 984, 162 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Surr. Ct. 1957); In the Matter of
Jones, 158 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Surr. Ct. 1957); In the Matter of Slade, 4 Misc. 2d 616,
158 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Surr. Ct. 1956); In the Matter of Atkinson, 4 Misc. 2d 992,
156 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Surr. Ct. 1956).
43. See Lauritzen, supra note 14, at 101, quoting*Guy Newhall of Lynn, Mass.,
as follows: "[T]he . . . common practice in Connecticut is to provide that taxes
should be paid out of the residue of the estate."
44. See Lauritzen, supra note 14, at 102, quoting Harold A. Kertz of Wash-
ington, D.C., as follows: "[T]he prevailing practice in Delaware is to provide in
the will that all estate taxes shall be paid from the residue of the estate with no
apportionment...."
45. Pennsylvania decisions have found the statutory rule of apportionment effec-
tive despite ambiguously worded tax clauses, as in Jeffery's Estate, 333 Pa. 15,
3 A.2d 393 (1939); In re Dravo's Estate, 388 Pa. 551, 131 A.2d 351 (1957); but
the past twelve months have witnessed an increasing willingness to find clauses
"unambiguous," when this resulted in an exclusion of apportionment, as in Wright
Estate, 391 Pa. 405, 138 A.2d 102 (1958); Oberheide Estate, 7 Fiduc. Rep. 20, 8
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the statutes require apportionment only as to nontestamentary assets,
the courts have frequently sustained clauses excluding the statutory
rule. 47
It is the considered judgment of this writer that disposers of prop-
erty, who are well advised, infrequently desire apportionment of fed-
eral estate taxes as to the assets passing under their wills; but rather
commonly desire such apportionment as to the assets passing outside
their wills. Thus the "normally operative rule" should embody these
attitudes, so that, if the will contains-no applicable tax clause, the
desires commonly present will be made effective. Any special circum-
stance, basing a desire to have a different rule applied, can then be
cared for by a tailor-made special clause. 48 The need for such clauses
in most wills would be thus eliminated.
THE MISSOURI PROBLEM AND ITS NEEDED SOLUTION
Missouri needs a statute fixing the location of the ultimate liability
for federal estate taxes. It presently has no such statute. It has a well
reasoned decision of the Missouri Supreme Court apportioning the
burden of such tax to a person receiving certain types of assets out-
side a will.49 Thus the courts have taken a step favorable to some
equitable apportionment. In this situation, trust administrators and
estate fiduciaries have grave uncertainties. When, and to what extent,
will the doctrine of judicial apportionment be expanded? Will it (as
it probably would) be expanded so as to apply to all nontestamentary
acquisitions, and stop there? Or will it go beyond this boundary and
Pa. D. & C. 2d 181 (1956); Roth Estate, 6 Fiduc. Rep. 603, 69 Dauph. 178 (Pa.
1957).
46. Commerce Union Bank v. Albert, 301 S.W.2d 352 (Tenn. 1957).
47. See, e.g., In re Berman's Estate, 49 N.J. Super. 95, 139 A.2d 138 (1958);
Kershaw v. Kershaw, 125 A.2d 126 (R.I. 1956).
48. In McLaughlin v. Green, 136 Conn. 138, 145-46, 69 A.2d 289, 293 (1949),
a form of clause approved by a joint Committee of the Connecticut State Bar
Association and the Connecticut Bankers Association on August 1, 1946, as effec-
tive to avoid proration is given as follows: "I hereby direct that all legacy, suc-
cession,oinheritance, transfer and estate taxes, levied or assessed upon or with
respect to any property which is included as part of my gross estate for the
purpose of Any such tax shall be paid by my executor (s) out of my estate in the
same manner as an expense of administration and shall not be prorated or appor-
tioned among or charged against the respective devisees, legatees, beneficiaries,
transferees or other recipients nor charged against any property passing or which
may have passed to any of them and that my executor(s) shall not be entitled
to reimbursement for any portion of ahy such tax from any such person."
Cf. In re Carrington's Estate, 136 N.E.2d 182 (Ohio 1956); Wright Estate,
391 Pa. 405, 138 A.2d 102 (1958); Oberheide Estate, 7 Fiduc. Rep. 20, 8 Pa. D. &
C. 2d 181 (1956).
49. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954).
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become as all inclusive as the ill-considered statute of New York?
Certainty is needed, both for proper fiduciary administration and for
the drafting of new instruments. This certainty should be moulded in
the light of the ample experience of other states. This means that the
statute should establish as the "normally operative rule" apportion-
ment of the tax as to all assets passing outside the will, but included
in the gross estate of a decedent for federal estate tax purposes; and
should establish the "burden-on-the-residue" principle as to all assets
passing under a will. Explicit provision should be included (as now
exists in every statute) making it possible for any disposer of prop-
erty, who so desires, to locate the burden elsewhere than where it
would fall by the statutory rule.
SIMILAR PROBLEMS IN OTHER STATES
Missouri is not alone in this need for new and carefully drawn
legislation on this topic. The ten states now having general appor-
tionment statutes should move to the middle ground. Similarly the
three states having "no apportionment" statutes should recognize the
needs injected by an increased frequency of large items of nontesta-
mentary assets. In thirty-one states statutes of the type here recom-
mended for Missouri would be desirable. Only in Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire and New Jersey do the existing statutes
reasonably fit modern needs.
DETAILS DESERVING COVERAGE
A state statute on the ultimate location of liability for death taxes
should take definite positions on as many matters of detail as are
likely to give rise to controversy. The experiences of the states now
having statutes on the topic are most suggestive as to these needed
details.
Duplicating, overlapping or conflicting statutes are undesirable.
Since existing federal provisions adequately cover the "proceeds of
policies of insurance on the life of a decedent receivable by a bene-
ficiary other than the executor,"50 and appointive assets,51 the state
statute can usefully exclude, explicitly these aspects of the problem
from coverage.52
Death taxes, other than the federal estate tax, exist in most states
and foreign countries. The statute can usefully gather all of these to-
50. See notes 9-10 supra.
51. See notes 11-12 supra.
52. It is possible, of course, to duplicate exactly the federal provision, as is
done in Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 162 (3b) (1951), and in Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-1117
(1955), but it is safer to exclude from the state statute what is adequately cared
for by federal enactment. To be avoided at all costs is an actual conflict between
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gether under one rule. The Alabama statute, in terms, applies to "all
estate taxes, whether state or federal."'' 3 The Arkansas statute is still
more inclusive applying to the "burden of any State and Federal
Estate, Death and Inheritance Taxes."5' The possible utility of a
clause applicable to the taxes of other countries is suggested by the
facts passed on by a recent decision of Pennsylvania.-5 A possible
limitation on the efficacy of a clause applicable in terms to the taxes
of other jurisdictions is suggested by a recent decision in Massa-
chusetts.56 Despite limitations on complete efficacy, which may de-
velop, there is real gain in a statutorily established "normally opera-
tive rule" of the broadest possible applicability. This simplifies greatly
the drafting task, when special circumstances justify a deviational
clause on tax burdens in the dispositive instrument.
A dispositive instrument, such as a will, is frequently prepared and
signed many years before the testator dies. Elasticity and adapta-
bility to changing circumstances would be served by a statutory pro-
vision, similar to the ones found in Delaware and in Pennsylvania
(since 1951), permitting a testator to lodge discretion in his executor
or trustee as to the persons and interests to be charged with the tax
burden.5
7
To whatever extent the statute directs apportionment of the tax
burden, a definitive section should make clear that the sum to be
apportioned includes any interest or penalties incurred, plus any sums
necessarily expended in determining the amount of tax liability or in
making the required apportionment; and is to be diminished by all
discounts earned by early payments, all state tax credits, all credits
for property previously taxed or for gift taxes theretofore paid; and
further that any refund later recovered is similarly apportionable.3'
the state and federal rules, as is illustrated concerning insurance in Ala. Code
Ann. tit. 51, § 449 (1) (Supp. 1953). Cf. note 59 infra, as to a useful state supple-
ment on the problem of insurance.
53. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 51, § 449(1) (Supp. 1953).
54. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 63-150 (1957).
55. Oberheide Estate, 7 Fiduc. Rep. 20, 8 Pa. D. & C. 2d 181 (1956).
56. Warfield v. Merchpn~ts Nat'I Bank, 147 N.E.2d 809 (Mass. 1958).
57. See, e.g., Del. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2906 (1953): such provision in a
will or in the terms of an inter vivos transfer may be in the form of a direction
or of a grant of discretion to an executor or trustee to apportion or allocate such
taxes or to pay such taxes out of the residuary estate under a will or from any
other portion or portions of the estate passing under the will or out of the prop-
erty transferred inter vivo&"
See also Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 883(a) (Supp. 1957).
58. Partial coverages on these points can be found in NJ. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 3A, c. 25, § 33 (1953) (credits for property previously taxed and gift taxes
paid, charges for interest); N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 124(3iii) (same as New
Jersey plus credits for early payment), § 124(7) (discretionary inclusion of costs
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When the item as to which apportionment is established as the
"normally operative rule" involves outsiders, such as an insurance
company, or a bank in which joint deposits have been found, or a
corporate transfer agent handling jointly held shares or bonds, some
states have thought it useful to include an express exoneration of
these third persons from tax liability when the third person has made
payment pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, or has made a
transfer of funds or other assets pursuant to the terms of the asset's
holding. 9 Such a provision would tend to eliminate some of the de-
lays, otherwise incident to apportionment, in realizing on the assets
of a decedent.
When the gross estate of a decedent is subject to charitable gifts or
to a marital deduction, special problems are raised. These problems
can be raised when either all the assets pass by the will of the decedent
or some of the assets pass outside the will. Thus the handling of these
problems in any statute on apportionment restricted to nontestamen-
tary assets, should conform to the state's handling of such problems
in an exclusively testamentary estate. Since the deductible gifts to a
charity or to a surviving spouse do not contribute to the size of the
tax, it is at least strongly arguable that the applicable apportionment
procedures should leave these items undiminished by the tax burden.
This is the position taken in the general apportionment statute of
Pennsylvania adopted in 1951.60 It is a position which has found sup-
port also from the courts under less clearly worded clauses-l in the
of determining tax and of making apportionment); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20,
§ 884(2), (3) (1956) (credits for property previously taxed and gift taxes paid,
credits for state taxes paid).
59. See, e.g., Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25435, § 3 (insurance companies), supplanted,
however, by Fla. Stat. Ann. § 734.041 (Supp. 1957) (substituting the "burden-on-
the-residue" rule); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 65A, § 5A (1953) (insurance companies
and banks).
60. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 884(b) (1957):
"Treatment of Deductions and Credits. The following principles shall apply
with respect to deductions and credits allowable: (1) Deductions Allowed by
Federal Revenue Laws in Determining the Value of Decedent's Net Estate. Any
interest for which deduction is allowable under Federal revenue laws in deter-
mining the value of decedent's net estate, such as property passing to or in trust
for a surviving spouse and charitable, public or similar gifts or bequests to the
extent of the allowed deduction, shall not be included in the computation pro-
vided for in Subsection (a) of Section four hereof [the apportionment procedure],
and to that extent no apportionment shall be made against such interest, except
that when such an interest is subject to a prior present interest which is not
allowable as a deduction, the estate tax apportionable against the present interest
shall be paid from principaL"
61. Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 2076 (1949) provides that "such proration shall be
made [proportionately] ... except that in making such proration allowances shall
be made for any exemptions granted by the act imposing the tax and for any
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general apportionment statute of Connecticut - and in the restricted
apportionment statute of New Jersey. The statutes of Arkansas,
California, Delaware, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Tennessee
and Virginia have "except" clauses, somewhat like that of Connecti-
cut,64 but in New York, at least, this clause has not prevented con-
flicting results. 5 Much thought is needed in reaching a well based
determination as to the desired state policy on this point, and then
real attention is deserved for the putting of this policy into unambigu-
ous language.6  Unless the state's policy is unchangeably fixed to the
contrary with respect to estates exclusively testamentary, the writer
would favor a clause like that operative in Pennsylvania since 1951.6
Any requirement of apportionment can make delays in the full en-
joyment of the thus burdened interest. This consequence is narrowed,
but not eliminated, by confining apportionment to nontestamentary
assets. Even when so confined the resultant delays could be awkvard
with respect to jointly owned bank accounts, jointly owned lands and
jointly owned securities, as well as with respect to insurance and
appointive assets. Hence apportionment statutes, both general and
restricted in scope, commonly contain provisions allowing the giving
deductions allowed by such act for the purpose of arriving at the value of the
net estate. . . !' The New Jersey statute (N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 3A, c. 25,
§§ 31, 33 (1952)) expressly excludes tenancies by the entirety and has an "ex-
cept" clause similar to that of Connecticut.
62. New York Trust Co. v. Doubleday, 144 Conn. 134, 128 A.2d 192 (1956);
Jerome v. Jerome, 139 Conn. 285, 93 A.2d 139 (1952).
63. Newberry v. Neeld, 46 N.J. Super. 216, 134 A.2d 505 (1957); Case v.
Roebling, 42 N.J. Super. 545, 127 A.2d 409 (1956).
64. See note 61 supra.
65. For cases freeing the spouse from the tax burden, see In the Matter of
Paine, 7 Misc. 2d 795, 164 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Surr. Ct. 1956) ; In the Matter of Mattes,
205 Misc. 1098, 130 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Surr. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 942, 132
N.E.2d 314 (1955).
For cases subjecting the spouse to the tax burden, see In the Matter of
Salterini, 7 Misc. 2d 497, 164 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Surr. Ct. 1957) ; In, the Matter of
Slade, 4 Misc. 2d 616, 158 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Surr. Ct. 1956) (charity); In the Matter
of Noble, 3 Misc. 2d 565, 155 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Surr. Ct. 1956); In the Matter of
Wolf, 204 'Misc. 356, 121 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Surr. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 280, 121
N.E.2d 224 (1954).
For similar holding in another jurisdiction, see Wells Fargo Bank v. Kirkwood,
325 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1958).
66. See Traders Natl Bank v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Mo.
1956) ; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953).
The problem is discussed in Jesse, Spouse's Election and Marital Deduction, 91
Trusts & Estates 768 (1952) ; Annot, 15 A.L.R.2d 1218 (1951).
Arguing strongly for including spouse and charities in the tax burden, see
Lauritzen, supra note 14, at 85-87.
67. See note 60 supra.
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of security as a means for accelerating distribution prior to the often
long delayed ultimate fixation of the amount of tax liability."
Four very special problems can usefully be covered by an appor-
tionment statute. In some states the historical differentiations be-
tween land and personalty could cause difficulty in applying an appor-
tionment statute."3 An express exclusion of the significance of this
anachronistic rule in applying the statute can prevent useless litiga-
tion. In a statute confining apportionment to nontestamentary assets
it might seem unnecessary to include a provision that the "burden-on-
the-residue" principle still requires apportionment of the tax between
sharers in the residue of the testamentary assets. Such a provision
can, however, forestall a claim that the apportionment statute, phrased
solely in terms of nontestamentary assets, was designed to alter this
rule. Frequently a part of the tax is "apportioned" to an aggregate
of interests divided into present and future interests. The apportion-
ment statute must deal expressly with the problems thereby raised.
A special form of this problem exists when the future interest is in
favor of a normally tax exempt charity, while the present interest is
not tax exempt in character. The existing statutes and court decisions
typically require the apportioned tax to be paid from the princi-
pal.-0 This decreases the sum earning for the present interest owner,
and also the sum eventually to be received by the future interest
owner. Even in the case of the future interest charitable taker, sup-
posed above, the result thus attained seems better than that resulting
from any other procedure thus far suggested for consideration. Non-
testamentary assets frequently are governed by dispositive instru-
ments independent of the decedent's will. Since the apportionment
statute declares only the "normally operative rule," the statutory rule
can normally be freely changed by appropriate provisions in the
decedent's will. No trouble arises when the will undertakes to relieve
68. See, e.g., general apportionment statutes, Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. § 2078
(1949); Del. Rev. Stat. Ann. it. 12, § 2904 (1953); N.Y. Dec. Est Law § 124(6)
(1950) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 885(b) (Supp. 1957k; Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-1117
(1955); Va. Code § 64-153 (1950).
See a similar provision in an apportionment statute confined to nontestamen-
tary assets, N.J. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 3A, c.25, § 36 (1952).
69. See Preston, Apportionment of Federal Estate Tax, 3 Western Res. L. Rev.
164 (1951).
This difficulty apparently is nonexistent in Missouri, under the decision in
Traders Nat'l Bank v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
70. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 88: 2 (1955); N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 3A,
c. 25, § 32 (1953) (excellently phrased).
See also In the Matter of Thomas, 197 Misc. 552, 96 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Surr. Ct.
1950); In ,e Higgins, 99 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Surr. Ct. 1950); In the Matter of
Williamson, 38 Wash. 2d 259, 229 P.2d 312 (1951).
Cf. McCeney v. District of Columbia, 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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the assets disposed of by an inter vivos trust from a tax burden im-
posed by the apportionment statute. If, however, the inter vivos trust
is governed by the law of another state, and the will clause, or the
apportionment statute of the decedent's state, undertakes to compel
contribution by the foreign trustee, trouble can be expected."1 The
most that the apportionment statute can do-,-and this it should do--
is to establish a hierarchy of control between tax clauses in the
will of a decedent and tax clauses in other dispositive instruments
affecting assets in his gross estate, operative within the outer limits
established by the rules of conflict of laws 2."
In general, the apportionment statute can well avoid establishing
a detailed, specialized and different procedure for making the appor-
tionment. Most -states, have adequate procedural machinery for the
adjudication of controversial matters arising in the administration
of an estate. Complexity, which is useless, is added by a whole new
set of procedural provisions. Some provision incorporating the exist-
ing procedural machinery is desirable. The statute of Maryland con-
tains one additional clause probably worth incorporating, namely, a
short statute of limitations applicable to actions brought for contribu-
tion to a paid tax. 3 One other problem of procedure must be covered.
Suppose that the fiduciary in charge of the Estate of A has lawfully
ascertained that $10,000 of the tax which he has paid should -be ap-
portioned to, and paid by, X. For some reason this sum is not col-
lectible from X. X may have become bankrupt. X may be a nonresi-
dent and unreachable by effective process. Some provision is needed
locating the ultimate liability for an apportioned, but uncollectible,
portion of the tax. The New Jersey statute provides that: "If the
fiduciary cannot recover the amount of tax and interest thereon
apportioned against a transferee, the amount not recoverable shall be
dealt with in such manner as the court may determine."7' New York
and Pennsylvania have similar provisions.-5 Under such a statute the
residue would normally be charged. Considerable risk of unconstitu-
tionality lies in a provision directing reapportionment of the uncol-
lected portion against the available victims.
71. See, e.g., Warfield v. Merchants Natl Bank, 1471 N.E.2d 809 (Mass. 1958);
cf. Lauritzen, supra note 14, at 88-96.
72. See In re Berman's Estate, 49 N.J. Super. 95, 139 A.2d 138 (1958); In the
Matter of Osborn, 8 Misc. 2d 859, 166 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. 1957); see also
Scoles, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes aid Conflict of Laws, 55 Colum.
L. Rev. 261 (1955).
73. Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 81, § 162(7) (1957) (one year).
74. N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 3A, c. 25, § 35 (1953).'
75. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law, § 124(5); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 885 (Supp. 1957).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss4/1
ULTIMATE TAX LIABILITY
CONCLUSION
Thus it is urged that an apportionment statute should be confined
in its operation to nontestamentary assets; and in detail, should
a) avoid any duplication of the insurance and appointive asset
provisions in sections 2206 and 2207 of the Internal Revenue
Code;
b) apply not only to the federal estate tax but also to all other death
taxes, domestic and foreign;
c) permit a testator to authorize discretionary deviations by his
executor;
d) define carefully the items includible in, and excludible from,
the sum to be apportioned;
e) relieve third persons from collateral liability;
f) cover carefully the treatment in apportionment, of marital
deductions and charitable gifts, conforming to the general policy
of the states on these points;
g) allow the giving of security to permit distributions prior t6
ultimate fixation of the amount of the tax;
h) cover the specific questions of
i) equal liability of land and personalty;
ii) continuing apportionment between residuary takers;
iii) the payment of the apportioned tax by future interest
takers, from the principal;
iv) the hierarchy of control as between tax clauses in separate
instruments;
i) incorporate preexisting procedures for the making of apportion-
ments, except for the addition of
i) a short statute of limitations on actions to recover appor-
tioned parts of the tax; and
ii) an express provision for a judicial discretionary handling
of apportioned items proved to be uncollectible.
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